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The Louisiana Supreme Court Defended: A Rebuttal
of The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An
Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of
Campaign Money on the Judicial Function
Kevin R. Tully*
E. Phelps Gay**
"A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is
putting on its shoes."
Mark Twain (attributed)
"Figures often beguile me, particularly when I have the
arranging of them myself; in which case the remark attributed to
Disraeli would often apply with justice and force: 'There are three
kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.'"
Mark Twain, Chapters from My Autobiography,
in NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW (1907)
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to rebut, from a practitioner's
point of view, the argument authors Vernon Valentine Palmer and
John Levendis set forth in their Tulane Law Review article entitled,
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and
Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial
Function.' Briefly stated, Palmer and Levendis opine that
"[s]tatistically speaking, campaign donors enoy a favored status
among litigants appearing before the justices." They conclude that
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"the very qualities needed in the highest court-independence,
impartiality, and adherence to the rule of law-may have been
eroded by the corrosive effect of judicial campaign money." 3
However, this attempt to draw the Louisiana Supreme Court
into disrepute suffers from numerous fatal flaws. First, the Palmer
and Levendis claim that campaign contributions determine judicial
votes is founded on a data set that abounds with errors in recording
those votes and contributions. Brought to light by our initial review
of the cases, these errors are so pervasive that the Tulane Law
Review has posted an erratum notice and the Dean of Tulane Law
School, Lawrence Ponoroff, has written a letter of apology to the4
Louisiana Supreme Court. Both the erratum notice and the letter
of apology admit that the errors call the Palmer and Levendis
conclusions into question.
Second, Palmer and Levendis use an incorrect statistical
methodology. As explained in the companion methodological
critique by economics professors Robert J. Newman, Dekalb
Terrell, and Janet Speyrer, Palmer and Levendis ignore the
relevant literature on the proper statistical test for dealing with the
problem of "simultaneity," which means they cannot determine
whether contributions are affecting votes or whether a justice's
voting record instead drives the contributions he or she receives.
5
Indeed, Palmer and Levendis seem to realize their statistical
analysis is questionable. They claim that Louisiana Supreme Court
Justices have been swayed by campaign contributions, but they
later concede-and bury-in a footnote that "[i]t is worth
observing that this Article does not claim that there is a cause and
effect relationship between prior donations and judicial votes in
favor of donors' positions." Palmer's and Levendis's concession
-that their study does not show any cause and effect between a
donation and a judicial decision-renders their assertions of
improper influence, made throughout the body of their article and
in their concluding paragraph, meaningless. 7
3. Id.
4. Susan Finch, Law Dean Writes of Regret Over Errors-Author Stands
By Article's Conclusions, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 17, 2008, at
M1 (discussing letter of apology and erratum notice); Letter from Lawrence
Ponoroff, Dean of the Tulane Law School, to the Louisiana Supreme Court
(Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.lasc.org/press-room/press-releases/2008/AR-TU_
APOLOGY_ LETTER.pdf.
5. Robert Newman, Janet Speyrer & Dek Terrell, A Methodological
Critique of The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and
Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 69
LA. L. REv. 307 (2009).
6. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1294 n.14 (emphasis added).
7. Seeid. at 1292, 1305, 1314.
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Third, Palmer's and Levendis's arguments are based on a set of
assumptions divorced from the common sense reality of legal
practice. For example, they assume that unanimous decisions are
inherently non-controversial and throw them out of their sample.
They also rest much on their analysis on the patently false notion
that each justice's combined "pro-plaintiff' or "pro-defendant"
voting percentage across diverse areas of law provides useful
information about that justice's judicial philosophy. More
fundamentally, Palmer and Levendis never analyze the legal
arguments or factual issues in any one of the cases in their data set.
They never show that a justice's vote was improper or lacked a
sound legal foundation.
Finally, the goal of Palmer's and Levendis's article is to justify
an automatic recusal rule when a campaign contributor appears
before a justice. No other state has such a rule, for the simple
reason that it would allow litigants to donate strategically to
justices they do not want deciding their cases. Thus, even if their
study was not inherently flawed and invalid, their proposed
solution to the problem they supposedly discover is unwise and
unworkable.
Although unpersuasive on its face, the Palmer and Levendis
article-and the authors themselves-generated a certain amount
of publicity.8 Moreover, although the Tulane Law Review and
Dean Ponoroff have admitted the data set errors call the claims of
the article into question, at least one of the authors has indicated
his intention to republish with corrected data and the same
conclusions. 9 Because the Palmer and Levendis article is
fundamentally flawed and unfairly disparages the Louisiana
Supreme Court and its justices, we have written this Rebuttal.' 0
Along with the companion critique on statistical methodology by
Newman, Terrell, and Speyrer,11 it responds for the Supreme Court
to the contentions Palmer and Levendis make.
8. Adam Liptak, Looking Anew at Campaign Cash and Elected Judges,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at A14; Posting of Peter Lattman to Wall Street
Journal Law Blog, Tulane Law Prof Examines Whether Justices are for Sale,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/01/29/tulane-law-prof-examines-whether-justices
-are-for-sale/ (Jan. 29, 2008, 9:11 EST).
9. Finch, supra note 4, at MI.
10. The authors, private attorneys asked by the Louisiana Supreme Court to
review, analyze, and check the accuracy of the Palmer and Levendis article,
prepared an earlier version of this Rebuttal which was distributed during the
General Assembly of the Annual Meeting of the Louisiana State Bar
Association on June 12, 2008. Both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the
Tulane Law Review placed that version of this Rebuttal on their respective web
sites.
11. See Newman et al., supra note 5.
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II. ERRORS IN RECORDING CONTRIBUTIONS AND VOTES
In a draft version that was circulated to the news media, the
Palmer and Levendis data set was described as 181 cases decided
between 1992 and 2006 with at least one dissenting vote, eighty-
five of which had at least one "litigant or . . .lawyer who had
donated to one of the justice's campaigns."' 2 This changed
substantially in the final version. This is how the published Palmer
and Levendis article describes their method of selecting cases for
their data set:
Our analysis included every case decided by the court from
1992 to 2006 in which (1) there was a donor to a current
justice before the court, and (2) there was at least one
dissenting opinion. All writ applications, criminal cases,
and lawyer disciplinary cases were excluded. These criteria
yielded a set of 186 cases falling within eight subject areas:
torts/negligence, employment/labor, domestic relations/
family law, constitutional law, government, real property,
health, and "other."'
3
The shift from requiring a dissenting vote in each case to
requiring both a dissent and a contributor before the court is a
dramatic one, considering each version of the paper purports to
reach the same conclusions. However, our main concern is with
Palmer's and Levendis's errors in recording votes and
contributions for their cases, regardless of how they were selected.
We first set out to check on a limited basis whether the Palmer
and Levendis data set-the selected cases with votes attributed to
the justices for "plaintiff" or "defendant" and receipt of campaign
contributions from "winners" or "losers"--was accurate in
recording contributions.14 To see, we examined the contributors to
Justice John Weimer's campaign committee and compared those
contributors to the Palmer and Levendis data set. We selected
12. Vernon Valentine Palmer & John Levendis, The Louisiana Supreme
Court in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of
Campaign Money on the Judicial Function 4 (unpublished draft, on file with the
authors).
13. See Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1297 (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
14. The Palmer and Levendis data table was originally available to the
public on the Tulane Law Review web site. See Palmer & Levendis, supra note
1, at 1298 n.21. However, at the time of this writing, it has been removed. A
copy is on file with the authors. VERNON PALMER & JOHN LEVENDIS, DATA
TABLE FOR "THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT IN QUESTION" (2008) [hereinafter
DATA TABLE].
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Justice Weimer because he was the newest justice on the court,
serving since 2001. Therefore, he had the fewest number of cases
in the data set to review.
We went to the Louisiana Ethics Administration's website and
downloaded the lists of contributors to Justice Weimer's campaign
committee. 15 The committee filed contribution reports covering the
years 2001 and 2002. We then looked at all parties-plaintiffs,
defendants, amicus or third parties-and their respective attorneys
named in each of the cases Palmer and Levendis cited in reference
to Justice Weimer. Next, we compared the parties and attorneys, to
the extent possible, to the contributor list and the amount of
contributions was noted and summarized.
To our great surprise, we found the Palmer and Levendis data
set, at least insofar as Justice Weimer was concerned, contained
substantial errors. Our comparison of the publicly available
campaign contribution reports to the Palmer and Levendis data set
shows: (1) errors in the amounts of contributions; (2) contributions
where none existed; and (3) cases in which Justice Weimer did not
participate. A certified public accountant verified those findings of
errors in the financial contribution data attributed to Justice
Weimer.
16
For instance, in Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water District,
17
Palmer and Levendis show in their data set that Justice Weimer
sided for plaintiff, and that plaintiff had contributed $2,000 to the
justice's campaign committee fourteen months before the
decision.' Our review of the records revealed no contribution to
Justice Weimer's campaign committee by plaintiff or by plaintiff's
attorneys. 19
In Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission v. Olivier,
Palmer's and Levendis's data set attributes a $500 contribution
from the 2revailing plaintiff to Justice Weimer's campaign
committee, yet the public records indicate no contribution to the
justice's campaign committee from plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney.
In Salvant v. State,21 the Palmer and Levendis data set shows
defendant contributed $1,000 to Justice Weimer's campaign
15. La. Bd. of Ethics, Filings by John L. Weimer, http://www.ethics.state.la.
us/cgi-bin/la98/forms/CAN990366/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2008).
16. Letter from Holly Sharp, Certified Public Accountant, LaPorte, Sehrt,
Romig & Hand, to Phelps Gay & Kevin Tully, Partners, Christovich & Kearney
LLP (July 25, 2008) (on file with authors).
17. 836 So. 2d 14 (La. 2003).
18. DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 15.
19. 892 So. 2d 570 (La. 2005).
20. DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 19.
21. 935 So. 2d 646 (La. 2006).
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22
committee fifty-seven months before the case. Our search of the
public records can find no such contribution from the defendant
State of Louisiana or from the state's attorneys or their law firm.
While the mistakes discussed above are bad enough, Palmer
and Levendis made even bigder blunders. In ANR Pipeline Co. v.
Louisiana Tax Commission, a tax case in which five interstate
pipeline companies brought claims against the Tax Commission
concerning ad valorem taxes paid under protest, Palmer and
Levendis contend that plaintiff contributed $1,000 to Justice
Weimer's campaign committee and that Justice Weimer had voted
for plaintiff.24 Reading the case shows that Justice Weimer did not
vote for plaintiff or for defendant. Justice Weimer was recused
from the case, as the unnumbered footnote states: "Retired Judge
Walter F. Marcus, Jr., assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for
Associate Justice John L. Weimer, recused.'
25
In sum, even our cursory review of the cases Palmer and
Levendis selected and in which Justice Weimer participated
yielded errors about who contributed, the amounts of contributions,
and inclusion of a case in which Justice Weimer had not
participated. Indeed, in at least six out of the twenty-four cases
Palmer and Levendis claimed Justice Weimer sided with a
contributor, they were wrong, a 25% error rate.26 Given the errors
we uncovered in the Palmer and Levendis data set, it seems
reasonable to surmise that the data set would also contain
numerous errors about the other justices.27
We were able to check the entire Palmer and Levendis data set
for other kinds of errors. We looked at each case to determine: (1)
if Palmer and Levendis always correctly identified the party for
22. DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 20.
23. 851 So. 2d 1145 (La. 2003).
24. DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 16.
25. ANR Pipeline, 851 So. 2d at 1146 n. Justice Weimer was recused
because he had ruled on a matter in the litigation while serving as a judge on the
Court of Appeal. See Notice of Recusal, ANR Pipeline Co. v. Louisiana Tax
Comm'n, No. 02-C-1479 c/w 02-C-2261 (La. 2003) (public record on file with
the Louisiana Supreme Court).
26. The two other cases where we found errors are Bailey v. Khoury, 891
So. 2d 1268 (La. 2005) and Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex Energy,
Inc., 893 So. 2d 789 (La. 2005). See DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 19. In
Bailey, the data table lists a contribution from the plaintiff of $2500, but there
are no public records of any contributions from the plaintiffs or their attorneys.
Letter from Holly Sharp, supra note 16. In Terrebonne Parish, the plaintiff's
contribution was listed as $3500 when it was actually $500, which means the
defendant, not the plaintiff, was the net contributor in the case. Id.
27. We are continuing our investigation of the flawed Palmer and Levendis
data set as it relates to other Louisiana Supreme Court Justices, including review
of campaign contribution data on file at the Louisiana State Archives.
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whom a given justice voted; and (2) if there would be further
examples of Palmer and Levendis wrongly attributing a ruling to a
justice in a case where the justice did not participate. To our
amazement, we found more errors of both types than we imagined
we would. Significantly, we found errors made in the data set in
roughly 20% of the opinions included in the study. In other words,
in thirty-eight of the 186 opinions included in the study, the
information about the case on which Palmer and Levendis based
their conclusions is just plain wrong in recording how a justice
voted or even if the justice was on the panel that decided the case.
In the appendix to this Article, we list those cases in the data set
where we found Palmer and Levendis erred in recording votes or
participation, and we identify their errors.
The significant errors we identify in approximately 20% of the
cases Palmer and Levendis included in their data set call into
suspicion whether anyone involved in the Palmer and Levendis
article carefully read, let alone factually and procedurally analyzed,
the cases while they compiled their data set. Palmer and Levendis
do not claim they read any of the cases which comprise their data
base. Instead, they report "[e]ach case was thoroughly read and
analyzed by a researcher. Once the cases and contribution
information were gathered, we entered our observations into a
standard data table."28 Neither the reader nor we know who the
"researchers" were or what qualifications they possessed to
"analyze" a single case. The mistakes in the Palmer and Levendis
data set suggest the "researchers" read the cases superficially at
best. Palmer and Levendis acknowledge in an unnumbered
footnote that "[a]ny errors that remain [in their article] are of
course [their] own."79
We, of course, did not participate in creating the Palmer and
Levendis data set. But we think we understand at least one reason
the Palmer and Levendis data is compiled incorrectly. Pursuant to
Act 512 of 1992,30 an additional judgeship was created for the
Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit to be elected from the First
District of the Fourth Circuit. The new judge was "immediately
assigned to the Louisiana Supreme Court" and remained on that
court until a special election was held for a newly-created Orleans
Parish Supreme Court district.3 ' To accommodate this eighth
justice until the Court reverted to seven justices, the Supreme
Court adopted amendments to Rule IV of the Louisiana Supreme
28. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1298.
29. Id. at 1291 n.
30. 1992 La. Acts No. 512.
31. Id.
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32Court that were in effect from 1993 to their repeal in 2000. Asamended, Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IV, Part II, provided:
PART 1-Assignment of Writs; Deciding Cases.
Section 1. Each of the seven elected justices and the
assigned justice shall participate and share equally in the
cases, duties and powers of the court. The justices shall be
assigned on a rotating basis to panels of seven justices, and
the cases shall be assigned randomly to the seven-justice
panels for decision.
Section 2. Each application for writs shall, upon being
filed, be assigned to a panel of seven of the eight justices
on a rotating basis. The justice who is not assigned to a
panel may nonetheless participate in discussions of the
application in conference, but shall not have a vote on any
such application.
Section 3. Each writ granted for argument and opinion
shall be reassigned to a panel of seven justices selected on a
rotation basis, without regard to which justices participated
in the grant of the writ. The seven justices on the panel will
be responsible for the case through final decision and
rehearing, if necessary. The justice who is not assigned to a
panel may nonetheless participate in conference
consideration and discussion, but shall not have a vote on
the case.
33
In other words, from January 1993 until September 2000, the
Louisiana Supreme Court had eight members, but a panel
comprised of only seven justices-with the eighth not voting-
would decide a given case. Examining the Palmer and Levendis
data set, as outlined above, seems to indicate they did not
understand this fact and therefore attributed to a Justice a vote in a
case when, in fact, the Justice was not on the panel that decided the
case. Reading the cases carefully would have revealed this
information to the researchers who reviewed the cases and to
Palmer and Levendis because the cases clearly state which of the
Court's Justices was not sitting on the panel deciding the case.
34
The number of errors we discovered in our review of the data
set calls into doubt not only the accuracy of Palmer's and
Levendis's underlying data, but the conclusions they draw from
32. LA. SUP. CT. R. IV, pt. 11 (1993) (repealed 2000).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Aucoin v. State, 712 So. 2d 62, 63 n. (La. 1998) (including a
footnote, following the name of Justice Knoll, author of the majority opinion,
which read, "Victory, J., not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2, § 3").
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that data. If Palmer's and Levendis's data-the foundation upon
which they built their thesis-is defective, their statistically-
derived conclusions necessarily must fall. The letter of apology
from Dean Ponoroff and the erratum notice posted by the Tulane
Law Review both admit that the data errors call the conclusions of
the study into question.35 Because one of the authors has indicated
an intention to republish with supposedly corrected data, 36 we have
listed the voting and participation errors we found in an appendix
as a means to help check any revised version. However, the list we
provide should not be understood as final and complete. There is
every reason to believe the recorded contributions for other justices
will also contain mistakes.
III. PALMER'S AND LEVENDIS'S ASSUMPTIONS ARE FLAWED
Even if the Palmer and Levendis data set was accurate, their
study is invalid because of its flawed statistical methodology and
because of several unwarranted assumptions that underlie its
analysis. We are not statisticians, so the methodological discussion
is presented in the companion critique by several prominent
professors trained in econometrics.37 In summary, Palmer's and
Levendis's neglect of the relevant social science literature on votes
and campaign contributions led them to choose a statistical test that
cannot adequately determine whether contributions are driving
judicial votes or instead votes are driving contributions. 38 But even
though we are not specialists in quantitative analysis, we are
experienced lawyers. This provides more than enough grounding
to discuss several unfounded assumptions at the heart of Palmer's
and Levendis's argument.
A. The Exclusion of Unanimous Cases
First, Palmer and Levendis exclude all unanimous cases from
their data set. They justify this by stating:
Our rationale for limiting the study to cases involving one
or more dissents was to exclude simple and routine cases
and thus hopefully to capture those in which, as shown by
the court's own internal disagreement, the issues were
significant and difficult. The purpose of this limiting
35. See Finch, supra note 4.
36. Id.
37. Newman et al., supra note 5.
38. Id. at 308-309.
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feature, therefore, was to test the question of the influence
of money in significant cases.
39
Palmer and Levendis take for granted--or ask the readers to
accept-that limiting the scope of cases to those in which there is
"at least one dissent" excludes "simple and routine" cases and
captures cases involving "significant and difficult" issues. The
authors never cite any authority or studies to support their
assumption; nor do they provide the reader with specific case
information upon which to accept or reject their hypothesis.
Moreover, Palmer and Levendis ignore the scholarly literature that
suggests unanimously-decided cases, rather than being "simple and
routine" cases, are often ones involving "highly salient issues of
public policy. ' 4° Even a cursory review of unanimous Louisiana
Supreme Court decisions shows many significant ones, which
undermines the rationale Palmer and Levendis provide to explain
their selection criteria. Moreover, the Rules of the Louisiana
Supreme Court themselves cast doubt on this assumption.
The authors are either unaware of or overlooked Louisiana
Supreme Court Rule X,4 1 which eliminates "simple and routine"
cases from Supreme Court consideration. Under the Louisiana
Constitution, a civil litigant only has a right of appeal to the
Louisiana Supreme Court in a narrow range of cases, including
death penalty cases and cases in which a lower court struck down a
law as unconstitutional.42 Instead, a litigant who has not prevailed
in the court of appeal may file a writ of certiorari with the
Louisiana Supreme Court, asking that his or her case be accepted
for review.43 The court has discretion whether to grant a writ of
certiorari.44
Louisiana Supreme Court Rule X sets forth the "character of
the reasons" the court considers in deciding whether to grant a writ
of certiorari and hear a particular case. 45 Rule X requires that the
39. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1297-98. Here we must note yet
another error Palmer and Levendis made. In their data set, Palmer and Levendis
included Jurisich v. Jenkins, 749 So. 2d 597 (La. 1999); but, Jurisich was
decided without dissent.
40. See, e.g., Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and
Dissent in State Supreme Courts, 52 J. POL. 54, 58 (1990).
41. LA. SUP. CT. R. X, available at http://www.lasc.org/rules/supreme/
RuleX.asp.
42. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(D).
43. LA. CODE Crv. PROC. ANN. art. 2166 (2002).
44. LA. SUP. CT. R. X, § 1 (a).
45. The relevant section of Rule X reads:
Section 1. Writ Grant Considerations.
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case or issue a litigant seeks to bring before the supreme court
meet certain stringent considerations. The civil cases that the
supreme court may consider on writ of certiorari are those where
conflicting decisions by the various courts of appeal are involved;
a significant issue of law is unresolved; a controlling precedent
should be examined and perhaps overturned; a court of appeal has
erroneously interpreted a law or the constitution so as to "cause
material injustice or significantly affect the public interest;" or
where a court of appeal has so far departed from proper judicial
proceedings as to call for the court's supervisory authority.4
Rule X thus excludes "simple and routine" cases from those in
which writs of certiorari are granted by the supreme court.
Palmer's and Levendis's method of allegedly winnowing out
"simple and routine" cases from those involving "significant and
difficult issues" merely injects a limitation (one or more dissents)
which does not rest upon any objectively verifiable basis.
A brief review of cases the Louisiana Supreme Court has
decided in which there was no dissent demonstrates that Palmer's
and Levendis's thesis is wrong. For example, without dissent, the
(a) The grant or denial of an application for writs rests within the
sound judicial discretion of this court. The following, while neither
controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of the reasons that will be considered, one or more of which
must ordinarily be present in order for an application to be granted:
1. Conflicting Decisions. The decision of a court of appeal conflicts
with a decision of another court of appeal, this court, or the Supreme
Court of the United States, on the same legal issue.
2. Significant Unresolved Issues of Law. A court of appeal has
decided, or sanctioned a lower court's decision of, a significant issue of
law which has not been, but should be, resolved by this court.
3. Overruling or Modification of Controlling Precedents. Although
the decision of the court of appeal is in accord with the controlling
precedents of this court, the controlling precedents should be overruled
or substantially modified.
4. Erroneous Interpretation or Application of Constitution or Laws. A
court of appeal has erroneously interpreted or applied the constitution
or a law of this state or the United States and the decision will cause
material injustice or significantly affect the public interest.
5. Gross Departure From Proper Judicial Proceedings. The court of
appeal has so far departed from proper judicial proceedings or so
abused its powers, or sanctioned such a departure or abuse by a lower
court, as to call for an exercise of this court's supervisory authority.
(b) The application for writs shall address, in concise fashion, why the
case is appropriate for review under the considerations stated in
subsection (a) above, in accordance with Section 3 or 4 of this rule.
LA. SuP. CT. R. X, § 1.
46. Id.
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court in Albright v. Southern Trace Country Club of Shreveport,
Inc., held that denying a female member of a country club access
to service in the club's "men only" dining room violated the
woman's state constitutional right to be free from arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable discrimination based on gender. 47 In
Louisiana Seafood Management Council v. Louisiana Wildlife &
Fisheries Commission, the court unanimously overturned the
district court's ruling that a law banning the use of gill nets by
commercial fishermen amounted to a taking of property without
just compensation and therefore violated the takings clause of the
48Louisiana Constitution. Also, applying the First Amendment
rights of persons to have access to public records, the court
unanimously held the divorce pleadings of a prominent
businessman should be unsealed and open to the public just as
everyone else's public records are. 49 Although there were no
dissents in these cases, surely they involved significant issues and
cannot be characterized as simple and routine.
50 "
B. "Pro-Plaintiff' or "Pro-Defendant" Voting Percentages Provide
Little or No Useful Information About a Justice s Judicial Philosophy
Palmer and Levendis at least recognize that they need to find
some way to account for judicial philosophy. 51 Rather than
contributions affecting votes, litigants might donate to justices with
legal views or preexisting voting tendencies they support.
However, Palmer's and Levendis's attempt to account for this
possibility is woefully inadequate. For the cases in their sample,
they calculate a justice's propensity to vote for plaintiffs or
defendants when there is no contributor present.S They then
compare the voting percentage where no contributor is present
with the voting percentages when either a plaintiff or defendant has
contributed.53 If a justice is significantly more likely to vote for
plaintiffs when plaintiffs have contributed or for defendants when
defendants have contributed, this supposedly shows contributions
47. 879 So. 2d 121 (La. 2004).
48. 715 So. 2d 387 (La. 1998).
49. See Copeland v. Copeland, 966 So. 2d 1040 (La. 2007).
50. Were Palmer and Levendis to apply their selection criterion (at least one
dissent) to decisions the United States Supreme Court rendered they would
exclude as "simple and routine" Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), a unanimous decision.
51. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1302.
52. Id. at 1303-04.
53. Id.
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had an effect, independent of a justice's preexisting judicial
philosophy.54
The problem is that their baseline for comparison-a justice's
voting percentage for plaintiffs or defendants when no contributor
is present-is a terrible proxy for a judicial philosophy. Palmer and
Levendis never define the significance of a "pro-plaintiff" or "pro-
defendant" voting record, but the unstated assumption seems to be
that "liberal" justices will vote for plaintiffs while "conservative"
ones will support defendants. However, a justice's combined pro-
plaintiff or pro-defendant voting percentage reveals next to nothing
about their underlying beliefs. Voting for a plaintiff means
dramatically different things depending on the area of law or the
facts in the case. Consider two of the cases from the Palmer and
Levendis data set, both involving components of the utility
corporation Entergy. In the first case, Entergy was the defendant,
sued by plaintiffs with personal injury claims arising from a
workplace accident.55 In the second case, Entergy was the plaintiff,
challenging a Louisiana Public Service Commission order that
reduced the rates it could charge customers. 56 Yet by Palmer's and
Levendis's reckoning, a vote against Entergy in the first case and a
vote for Entergy in the second would both constitute evidence of
the same pro-plaintiff "judicial philosophy," despite the absence of
any common legal or ideological principle that would explain the
two votes.
Indeed, in many circumstances voting for the plaintiff or the
defendant has no wider significance at all. In cases where an
individual sues a business for a tort or employment claim, or when
an individual sues the government, a judge might have a "pro-
plaintiff' or "pro-defendant" tendency connected to a real
"conservative" or "liberal" underlying disposition. But in
commercial cases between two businesses, or contract disputes
between individuals, the mere fact of voting for the plaintiff or the
defendant has no larger ideological or legal meaning.
Unsurprisingly, social scientists trying to control for a judge's
ideology or judicial philosophy rarely use pro-plaintiff or pro-
defendant voting percentage. Instead they try to find some measure
of ideological leaning independent of a judge's voting record.57
54. Id. at 1305.
55. Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 782 So. 2d 606 (La. 2001); DATA TABLE,
supra note 14, at 11.
56. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 730 So. 2d
890 (La. 1999); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 7.
57. See, e.g., Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda G. Hall, Measuring the
Preferences of State Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387 (2000) (the PAJID
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Moreover, when social scientists examine the effect of these
underlying dispositions on judicial decisions, the ideological
meaning of a vote for one party or another is determined by the
facts in each case,58 rather than an assumption that voting for or
against the plaintiff has the same significance in all decisions.
C. Palmer and Levendis Never Examine the Legal Issues or Factual
Questions in Any Case
The erroneous assumption that pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant
votes have a common meaning regardless of context points to an
even deeper problem with the Palmer and Levendis study. In
presenting their conclusions, Palmer and Levendis fail to draw the
reader to the specific facts of any case or show how a particular
justice voted on the issues presented. This neglect highlights the
disconnect between the authors' purely statistical approach and the
real-life work of judges who address themselves diligently and
impartially to specific cases with discrete issues to decide. Judges
do not keep a scorecard of their rulings in favor of one party or
another, nor do they decide a case by the flip of a coin. Instead,
their duty is to decide particular cases on the evidence presented
and on the governing law. For Palmer and Levendis to imply
judicial bias or improper influence because of campaign
contributions, without the slightest consideration of any particular
case or cases is simply wrong and constitutes a disservice to the
judiciary and the public. Palmer and Levendis fail to cite a single
case, much less demonstrate how a case was decided improperly
because of campaign contributions.
When a case is docketed in the Louisiana Supreme Court, it has
a procedural history, a record, a myriad of factual findings and
conclusions of law, prevailing and non-prevailing parties (except
in those cases where both sides feel aggrieved by the decisions
below), and discrete issues presented that the supreme court found
worthy to consider when deciding to grant the writ of certiorari.
59
Any of these factors can influence a decision, yet Palmer and
Levendis give them no attention at all.
matrix); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE AT~rrUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 321-22 (2002).
58. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 57, at 312-13.
59. As noted earlier, in considering whether to grant a writ of certiorari, the
supreme court examines the important factors set forth in Rule X to determine if
a case merits discretionary review. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
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To illustrate the point, we examine here one of the cases
contained in Palmer's and Levendis's data set. In St. Jude Medical
Office Building LP v. City Glass & Mirror, Inc.,6° the Louisiana
Supreme Court addressed the issue whether the purchaser at a
judicial sale of an office building had a right to intervene in the
former owner's suit against the building's contractor for negligent
construction. The underlying facts are briefly set forth below.
The St. Jude Medical Office Building Limited Partnership
contracted with Spaw Glass, Inc. to construct the St. Jude Medical
Office Building. Spaw. Glass contracted with various sub-
contractors.6 2 The building was completed, after which the
Partnership applied to Travelers for permanent financing.
63
Travelers advanced $25 million on the Partnership's promissory
note.64 The note was secured primarily by a real and chattel
mortgage on the building, the underlying property, and all related
land and improvements. The note and mortgage contained in rem
language limiting Travelers' default remedy to judicial sale of the
property. 
65
After closing the loan with Travelers, the Partnership
discovered defects in the building's construction, including water
leaks through windows and skylihts and ground settling damage
to the sidewalks and driveways.6 The Partnership ultimately sued
Spaw Glass and the subcontractors.
67
Thereafter, the Partnership defaulted on its note. Travelers filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, seeking recognition of its in rem mortgage on the
building, a judgment for the amount due on the note, and seizure
and sale of the building.6 8 On November 24, 1990, the federal
court entered a partial final judgment in favor of Travelers,
recognizing its mortgage and awarding damages of approximately
$26 million.69 Travelers executed on the judgment with a writ of
fieri facias directing the marshal to seize and sell the building.
Travelers acquired the building at a judicial sale for $7.5 million.'
60. 619 So. 2d 529 (La. 1993); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 1.
61. St. Jude, 619 So. 2d at 529.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 529-30.
64. Id. at 530.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
2009] 295
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
After the United States Marshal had seized the property but before
Travelers bought the building at the judicial sale, Travelers had
petitioned to intervene in the Partnership's state court lawsuit
against the building's contractor and subcontractors.7 1
In response to Travelers' intervention, the defendant contractor
and subcontractors filed an exception of prematurity which the
district court judge granted.72 The court granted Travelers leave to
refile its petition if it acquired title to the building.73 After
purchasing the building, Travelers again filed a petition of
intervention, alleging that it was subrogated to the Partnership's
claims for construction breaches of express and implied
warranties. 74 The Partnership and several of the defendants filed
exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action.75
The trial court sustained both exceptions and dismissed
Travelers' petition with prejudice. Travelers appealed. The court of
appeal, with one of the three judges writing a concurring opinion,, 76
affirmed the trial court's decision. Travelers sought a writ of
certiorari which the supreme court granted.77 The supreme court,
with two dissenting justices, affirmed the Court of Appeal.78 In
affirming the lower court, the five justices in the majority
thoroughly reviewed the law, distinguishing the case Travelers
cited in support of its alleged right to intervene, and so held that
Travelers did not have a right of action and hence no right to
intervene in the former owner's lawsuit against the contractor.
According to Palmer's and Levendis's data set, one of the five
justices in the majority had formerly received (through a campaign
committee, obviously) a contribution from the defendant in the
case (or its attorney).80 But of course, Palmer and Levendis
concede in their footnote 14 that they do not show "a cause and
effect relationship between prior donations and judicial votes in
favor of donors' positions." The outcome of the case was not
decided by the justice whose committee had received a campaign
contribution, being a five to two decision. (Many if not most of the
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. St. Jude Med. Office Bldg. LP v. City Glass & Mirror, Inc., 608 So. 2d
236 (La. App. 5th Cir.1992), affd, 619 So. 2d 529 (La. 1993).
77. St. Jude Med. Office Bldg. LP v. City Glass & Mirror, Inc., 613 So. 2d
959 (La. 1993) (granting certiorari).
78. St. Jude, 619 So. 2d at 531.
79. Id. at 530-31.
80. DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 1.
81. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1294 n.14.
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decisions in Palmer's and Levendis's data set were decided by a
supermajority, either six to one or five to two. 82)
Nor do Palmer and Levendis show in St. Jude Medical Office
Building that the "donee" justice's decision was flawed or
inconsistent with prior jurisprudence. The decision is also a
particularly good example of the problem with accounting for
judicial philosophy by classifying a justice as a "plaintiff's judge"
or a "defendant's judge."83 What wider ideological significance
can be found in voting for or against an intervener opposed by both
the original plaintiff and the defendants in a case? Palmer and
Levendis fail to analyze a single case on its merits, discuss the
possible legal issues or approaches a court or a judge might take,
or question the ultimate decision reached in any case. Finally,
Palmer's and Levendis's flawed, simplistic statistics-only approach
overlooks the fact that in St. Jude Medical Office Building, the
justice whose committee had earlier received a campaign
contribution decided the case like eight other judges: the district
court judge; the three judges who looked at the issue and rendered
the court of appeal decision; and the four other justices who were
in the majority. Perhaps the better legal view on the narrow issue
before the Court was the one adopted by the trial court, the
intermediate court, and the four other justices on the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
Instead of trying to account for the legal and factual issues that
affect decisions, the Palmer and Levendis article assumes that apart
from the impact of campaign contributions and judicial
philosophy, decisions are determined by random chance, with a
fifty percent chance of being decided one way or the other.84 In
reality each case arrives as a distinct, individualized matter to be
reviewed and decided according to its merits, not on a coin toss.
D. Other Flawed Assumptions
Palmer and Levendis made other questionable decisions in
constructing their study. They included as donors not just the
parties themselves but any "lawyer who had donated to one of the
justices' campaigns .... "85 The inclusion of attorneys as donors
contrasts with the New York Times study of the Ohio Supreme
Court which excluded attorneys from the main findings because
"[1]awyers are far more likely than other contributors to give to
82. See DATA TABLE, supra note 14.
83. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1303.
84. Id. at 1300-01, 1307.
85. Id. at 1294.
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judges across the ideological spectrum, and they generally do not
have the direct and consistent interest in the outcomes of cases that
their many and varied clients do.",
8 6
Another issue is Palmer's and Levendis's unstated assumption
that when a party appears before the Louisiana Supreme Court, the
justices know whether the party or his attorney has contributed to
the justice's campaign election committee and know the amount of
the past contribution. The article's authors state no facts to support
this unstated conclusion, but merely assume it is correct.8 7
Palmer and Levendis entirely fail to acknowledge (or fail to
comprehend) that candidates for election to Louisiana judicial
office, including those persons seeking election to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, are prohibited from personally soliciting or
accepting campaign contributions.8 8 Instead, campaign committees
of responsible persons may conduct campaigns for the judicial
candidate, and the committee may solicit and accept campaign
contributions and manage the expenditure of those funds. Palmer
and Levendis accord little significance to the monetary limits
placed upon a campaign contribution to a judicial campaign
committee. Although a political action committee can give up to
$10,000 if it meets certain membership requirements, 9 other
donors may give no more than $5,000 to the campaign committee
of a judicial candidate for the Louisiana Supreme Court.90 This cap
limits any one donor's campaign contributions to a judicial
86. How Information Was Collected, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/09/30/us/0 ljudges.web.html.
87. Palmer's and Levendis's data set is full of examples where the
campaign contribution, say of $500, was made four, five, six, seven, eight, nine,
ten or eleven years before the case was docketed, let alone decided by the
supreme court. See DATA TABLE, supra note 14. It stretches belief to suggest
that a justice of the supreme court (1) recalls that his or her campaign committee
received a $500 contribution eight years before; and (2) with that ancient
memory recalled, decided to vote in favor of the long-ago donor.
88. See LA. CODE JIJD. CONDUCT, canon 7(D)(1)-(3) (2008), available at
http://www.lasc.org/rules/supreme/cjc.asp. The campaign committee cannot
solicit contributions for a judicial candidate's campaign any earlier than two
years before the primary election, and contributions can only be solicited after
the election to extinguish the campaign's debt, if any. Id. canon 7(D)(3).
89. If a political action committee has over 250 members, each of whom
contributed at least $50 to the PAC during the preceding calendar year, and it
has been certified as meeting that membership requirement, it may give up to
$10,000 to a major office candidate. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1505.2(H)(2)(b)
(i) (2004).
90. Id. § 18:1505.2(H)(1)(a)(i), (2)(a)(i).
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candidate to avoid any appearance of undue influence, a goal
several professional organizations have endorsed.91
The authors also overlook the ten year term for a Louisiana
Supreme Court Justice, 92 which isolates the justices further from
any past campaign contributions their election campaign
committee may have obtained. This ten year period is longer than
the six year period served by justices of the Ohio Supreme Court,
the court that was the subject of the New York Times study to
which Palmer and Levendis repeatedly refer.93
IV. THE PALMER AND LEVENDIS SUGGESTED NEW RECUSAL RULE
WOULD INVITE MISCHIEF
Palmer and Levendis advise their readers that "[w]e began this
study with no preconceptions as to what we would find, and we
emerge from it with results that draw into question the voting
behavior of our highest court., 94 However, based upon statements
made to the press, it appears that Palmer had a preconceived
interest and goal when he embarked upon his study. In an
interview he gave to the New York Times in January 2008, Palmer
related that he could not understand how justices of the Louisiana
Supreme Court could routinely hear cases involving people who
had given the justices campaign contributions.95 Long before
embarking on the study, he had written letters to each of the seven
justices asking them to adopt a rule making disqualification
mandatory in cases in which a donor was present. Six months went
by without a response, so Palmer wrote again, bemoaning his use
of "seven more stamps" that led to "still ... no reply."96 According
to the article, Palmer was "peeved" and "decided to take a closer
look at the Louisiana Supreme Court" which led to Palmer's and
Levendis's article.97
Unsurprisingly, Palmer and Levendis use their conclusions to
suggest that Louisiana judges, including the Louisiana Supreme
Court Justices, should recuse themselves whenever a party or an
attorney has contributed to their campaigns for election or re-
91. See, e.g., Marc E. Williams, Welcome to the Judicial Silly Season, FOR
THE DEFENSE, Mar. 2008, at 1.
92. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
93. Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1293, 1294 (citing Adam Liptak &
Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2006, at Al).
94. See Palmer & Levendis, supra note 1, at 1314.
95. Liptak, supra note 8, at A14.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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election. Securing the adoption of such an automatic recusal rule is
what drove Palmer to begin the study, and it is the intended result
of his article. Apart from the numerous problems with the Palmer
and Levendis article that have already been discussed, their
proposed new rule is unwise and unworkable.
No state has adopted the proposal Palmer and Levendis
advance, 98 and it is easy to see why. Were such an automatic rule
in place, litigants or their attorneys could manipulate the system by
donating campaign money to judges whose judicial philosophy and
leanings the donors did not share and thereby guarantee that a
particular judge or Justice would not hear any cases involving the
donor. Rather than solving a problem that does not exist, Palmer
and Levendis propose an unworkable "solution" that invites
mischief and gamesmanship by attorneys and litigants to remove
judges from deciding cases by doing nothing more than writing a
small check to a campaign committee.
The better way to ensure campaign contributions do not
influence a justice's decision in any given case is how Louisiana
has approached the subject, namely by limiting the amount and
timing of campaign contributions that can be made to a judicial
candidate and preventing a judicial candidate from personally
soliciting or receiving a campaign contribution. Palmer and
Levendis overlook the obvious: it is not reasonable to suppose that
a Louisiana Supreme Court Justice would surrender his or her
judicial integrity because of the happenstance of having either a
party or an attorney before the court who donated $500 or $2,500
to the justice's campaign committee two or ten years earlier.
Palmer's and Levendis's faulty, statistically based study does not
comport with real-life observations of the way justices of our
supreme court undertake their duties. Their lightly concealed
allegation of corruption is unwarranted and unfair.
V. CONCLUSION
Our experience tells us that judges do their utmost to be
impartial. Naturally, each justice must individually decide the facts
98. Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David Pozen, The Best Defense:
Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L. J. 503, 520
(2007). Instead of providing for automatic recusal when a contributor is before
the court, Louisiana law provides for recusal of any judge where there is bias,
prejudice, or interest such that the judge is "unable to conduct fair and impartial
proceedings." LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 151(A)(5) (1999). Additionally,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to "perform judicial
duties without bias or prejudice." LA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, canon 3(A)(4)
(2008), available at http://www.lasc.org/rules/supreme/cjc.asp.
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and legal issues before the court as he or she sees fit, but each is
bound by a duty to uphold the rule of law. Despite their efforts,
Palmer and Levendis provide no solid evidence that the justices of
the Louisiana Supreme Court have betrayed this duty. To the
extent that Palmer and Levendis intended to provoke or contribute
to the scholarly debate on the judicial selection process-whether
through election or appointment-or on the rules for
disqualification of judges in certain circumstances, they failed.
Their article, replete with errors and false assertions, contributes
nothing to the ongoing scholarly debate on these public policy
questions.
The data set Palmer and Levendis constructed contains a
myriad of substantial errors, including who contributed, the
amounts of contributions, and attribution of contributions where
none were made. Of more concern, the data set repeatedly
mistakenly describes which justices ruled for which side of a case
and shows that a given justice participated in a decision when, in
fact, the respective justice did not participate in the voting, had
recused himself or herself from the case, or was not on the panel
that decided the case. These mistakes add up to a data set so
profoundly untrustworthy that no valid conclusions about the court
could be legitimately derived from it.
Even if the Palmer and Levendis data set were reliable (which
demonstrably it is not), the Palmer and Levendis statistically based
analysis, lacking reference to a single case and simplistically
classifying judicial philosophy as either "pro-plaintiff' or "pro-
defendant," paints a false picture of our Louisiana Supreme Court
Justices. The methodological critique authored by Professors
Newman, Terrell, and Speyrer, which demonstrates that Palmer
and Levendis employed faulty methodology in their study,
buttresses our belief. At the core, the Palmer and Levendis
conclusions do not withstand common sense and practical scrutiny.
2009]
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APPENDIX
* The data table reports that Justice Kimball voted for the
plaintiff in American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. St.
Martin Parish Police Jury, but she was not on the panel; rather,
her predecessor on the Court, Justice Luther Cole, participated
in this case. 9
9
* The data table reports that Justice Kimball voted for the
plaintiff in Smith v. Matthews, but again Justice Cole, not
Justice Kimball, was on the panel. 00
" Chief Justice Calogero is listed as voting for the plaintiff in
Talley v. Succession of Stuckey, but he recused himself and did
not participate on the panel.' 0
" The data table lists Chief Justice Calogero as voting for the
plaintiff in Horton v. McCrary, but Chief Justice Calogero
voted with the majority's ruling that was favorable in part to
the defendant, and also voted to rehear the case in favor of the
defendant.' 
02
* Justice Victory is listed as voting for the defendant in Stelly v.
Overhead Door Co. of Baton Rouge,10 3 but he was not on the
panel. 104
* Chief Justice Calogero is listed as voting for the plaintiff in
Martin v. Champion Insurance Co., but he was not on the
panel. 10
5
* The data table reports that in Garrett v. Seventh Ward Hospital
Chief Justice Calogero ruled for the defendant and Justices
Johnson, Kimball and Victory ruled for the plaintiff.'0 6 In fact,
Justices Kimball and Victory joined in the majority opinion for
the defendant, not the plaintiff.10 7 Chief Justice Calogero
99. 609 So. 2d 201 (La. 1992); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 1. Justice
Cole's signed initials on the majority opinion can be found at American Waste &
Pollution Control Co. v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, No. 92-CA-1433, slip
op. at 1 (La. 1992) (public record on file with the Louisiana Supreme Court).
100. 611 So. 2d 1377, 1381 (La. 1993); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 1.
101. 614 So. 2d 55, 56 n. (La. 1993); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 1.
102. 635 So. 2d 199, 199 (La. 1994); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 1.
103. 646 So. 2d 905 (La. 1994); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 1.
104. When the court issued the Stelly opinion on December 8, 1994, Justice
Victory was not yet on the court. The reference to Justice Victory's willingness to
grant a rehearing came after the opinion was rendered and after Justice Victory
had joined the court, starting on January 1, 1995. Stelly, 646 So. 2d at 905.
105. 656 So. 2d 991, 993 n.1 (La. 1995); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 1.
106. 660 So. 2d 841(La. 1995); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 1.
107. The signed initials of Justices Kimball and Victory on the majority
opinion can be found at Garrett v. Seventh Ward Hospital, No. 95-C-00 17, slip
op. at 1 (La. 1995) (public record on file with the Louisiana Supreme Court).
302 [Vol. 69
DEFENDING THE COURT: A REBUTTAL
dissented in favor of the plaintiff and Justice Johnson was not
on the panel. '
08
" Justice Victory is listed as voting for the defendant in Ledbetter
v. Concord General Corp., but he was not on the panel. 10 9
* Justice Kimball is listed as voting for the plaintiff in Leonard v.
Parish of Jefferson, but she was not on the panel." 0
* Chief Justice Calogero is listed as voting for the defendant in
Olivier v. LeJeune, but he was not on the panel." 1
" Justice Kimball is listed as voting for the defendant in Smith v.
Department of Health & Hospitals, but she was not on the
panel. 1
12
" Justice Johnson is listed as voting for the defendant in
O'Rourke v. Cairns, but she was not on the panel."
13
* That data table lists Justice Kimball as voting for the defendant
and Justice Victory as voting for the plaintiff in Thompson v.
State, but in fact Justice Victory voted for the defendant with
the majority, and Justice Kimball dissented in favor of the
plaintiff."14
* Justice Knoll is listed as voting for the defendant in Lejano v.
Bandak,15 but she was not on the panel.
* Justice Kimball is listed as voting for the defendant in Banks v.
New York Life Insurance Co., but she was not on the panel. 116
* Justice Kimball is listed as voting for the plaintiff in Jurisich v.
Jenkins, but she was not on the panel."
7
* Justice Kimball is listed as voting for the defendant in Joseph
v. Dickerson, but she was not on the panel.
81 8
* Justice Traylor is listed as voting for the plaintiff in Timmons v.
Silman, but in fact he joined the majority opinion ruling for the
defendant. " 9
108. Garrett, 660 So. 2d at 842 n.1, 848.
109. 665 So. 2d 1166, 1167 n. (La. 1996); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 2.
110. 666 So. 2d 1061, 1061 n. (La. 1996); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 2.
111. 668 So. 2d 347, 348 n. (La. 1996); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 2.
112. 676 So. 2d 543, 544 n. (La. 1996); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 3.
113. 683 So. 2d 697, 705 (La. 1996); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 3.
114. 701 So. 2d 952, 957 (La. 1997); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 5.
Justice Victory's signed initials on the majority opinion can be found at
Thompson v. State, No. 97-C-0293, slip op. at 2 (La. 1997) (public record on file
with the Louisiana Supreme Court).
115. 705 So. 2d 158, 171 (La. 1997); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 5.
116. 737 So. 2d 1275, 1277 n. (La. 1999); DATATABLE, supra note 14, at 8.
117. 749 So. 2d 597, 598 n. (La. 1999); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 9.
118. 754 So. 2d 912 (La. 2000); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 10.
119. 761 So. 2d 507, 513 (La. 2000); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 10.
Justice Traylor's signed initials on the majority opinion can be found at
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• Justice Traylor is listed as voting for the plaintiff in St. Bernard
Police Jury v. Murla, but he was not on the panel.'
20
" The data table does not list a vote for Chief Justice Calogero in
Carrier v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., but he was on the panel and
joined the majority ruling for the defendant. 121
* Justice Traylor is listed as voting for the plaintiff in Clark v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., but he dissented
from the majority's ruling in favor of the plaintiff.122
* The data table lists Chief Justice Calogero and Justice Kimball
as voting for the defendant in Riddle v. Bickford, but both
justices dissented from the majority opinion that affirmed the
lower court's ruling in the defendant's favor.1
23
" Justice Johnson is listed as voting for the defendant in
Elevating Boats, Inc. v. St. Bernard Parish, but she did not
participate in the decision. 24
" The data table lists no vote for Chief Justice Calogero in
Hunter v. Wal-Mart Supercenter, but he was on the panel and
voted with the majority in favor of the defendant.' 2 5
* The data table lists no votes for Chief Justice Calogero and
Justices Traylor and Knoll in Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission, but all three participated
in the decision. 126 The Chief Justice and Justice Knoll ruled for
the defendant, while Justice Traylor sided with the plaintiff.
27
Timmons v. Silman, No. 99-C-3264, slip op. at 1 (La. 2000) (public record on
file with the Louisiana Supreme Court).
120. 761 So. 2d 532, 533 n. (La. 2000); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 11.
121. 776 So. 2d 439 (La. 2001); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 11. Chief
Justice Calogero's signed initials on the majority opinion can be found at
Carrier v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., No. 00-C-1335 (La. 2001), slip op. at 1
(public record on file with the Louisiana Supreme Court).
122. 785 So. 2d 779, 793 (La. 2001); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 12.
123. 785 So. 2d 795, 803 (La. 2001); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 12.
124. 795 So. 2d 1153, 1156 n. (La. 2001); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 12.
125. 798 So. 2d 936 (La. 2001); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 12-13. Chief
Justice Calogero's signed initials on the majority opinion can be found at Hunter
v. Wal-Mart Supercenter, No 01-C-0299, slip op. at 1 (La. 2001) (public record
on file with the Louisiana Supreme Court).
126. 815 So. 2d 27 (La. 2002); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 14.
127. Entergy Louisiana, 815 So. 2d at 27 (notation of Justice Traylor's
dissent). Chief Justice Calogero's and Justice Knoll's signed initials on the
majority opinion can be found at Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission, No. 01-CA-1725, slip. op. at 1 (La. 2002) (public record
on file with the Louisiana Supreme Court).
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* The data table lists Justices Johnson and Knoll as voting for the
plaintiff in Industrial Co. v. Durbin, but both justices dissented
from the majority opinion that ruled for the plaintiffs. 128
* The data table lists Justices Knoll and Traylor as voting for the
plaintiffs in Gregor v. Argenot Great Central Insurance Co.,
but Justice Knoll dissented from the majority ruling for the
plaintiff, while Justice Traylor was not on the panel.'
129
* Justice Traylor is listed as voting for the plaintiff East Baton
Rouge Parish School Board v. Foster, but he dissented from
the majority opinion that ruled for the plaintiff.130
" As noted above, the data table lists Justice Weimer as voting
for the plaintiff, ANR Pipeline Co. v. Louisiana Tax
Commission, but he was not on the panel.' 3'
" Justice Victory is listed as voting for the plaintiff in Talbot v.
Talbot, but he joined the majority opinion that ruled for the
defendant. 132
• Justice Johnson is listed as voting for the plaintiff in
Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, but she was not on the
panel. 1
33
* The data table lists Justices Kimball and Traylor as voting for
the defendant in Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., but both justices
dissented from the majority opinion that ruled for the
defendant. 134
* Justice Weimer is listed as voting for the plaintiff in Toston v.
Pardon, but he dissented from the majority opinion that ruled
for the plaintiff. 1
35
• The data table lists Justices Kimball and Johnson as voting for
the defendant in Medine v. Roniger, but both justices dissented
from the majority opinion that ruled for the defendant. 136
* Justice Johnson is listed as voting for the plaintiff in Louisiana
Municipal Ass 'n v. State, but she was not on the panel. 1
37
* The data table lists Justices Traylor and Victory as voting for
the plaintiff in Trahan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. United, Inc.,
128. 837 So. 2d 1207, 1218 (La. 2003); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 15-16.
129. 851 So. 2d 959, 961 n., 973 (La. 2003); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 16.
130. 851 So. 2d 985, 1001 (La. 2003); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 16.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
132. 864 So. 2d 590 (La. 2003); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 17. Justice
Victory's signed initials on the majority opinion can be found at Talbot v.
Talbot, No. 03-C-0814, slip op. at 1 (La. 2003) (public record on file with the
Louisiana Supreme Court).
133. 866 So. 2d 228, 230 n. (La. 2004); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 17.
134. 874 So. 2d 90, 105 (La. 2004); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 18.
135. 874 So. 2d 791, 804 (La. 2004); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 18.
136. 879 So. 2d 706, 717 (La. 2004); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 18.
137. 893 So. 2d 809, 814 n. (La. 2005); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 19.
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but both justices dissented from the majority opinion that ruled
for the plaintiff.13
8
* Justice Johnson is listed as voting for the defendant in Lemann
v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., but she dissented from the
majority opinion affirming the lower court's judgment for the
defendant.
39
* Chief Justice Calogero is listed as voting for the defendant in
Salvant v. State, but he dissented from the majority opinion that
ruled for the defendant.
1 40
138. 894 So. 2d 1096, 1110 (La. 2005); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 19.
139. 923 So. 2d 627, 637 (La. 2006); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 20.
140. 935 So. 2d 646, 660 (La. 2006); DATA TABLE, supra note 14, at 20.
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